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Nowadays, it has become almost a matter of course to say that the human mind is like
a computer. Folks in all walks of life talk of ‘programming’ themselves, ‘multi-tasking’,
running dierent ‘operating systems’, and sometimes of ‘crashing’ and being ‘rebooted’.
Few who have used computers have not been touched by the appeal of the idea that our
inner workings somehow resemble computing machines. e success of modern day
computational psychology appears to bears witness to the explanatory and predictive pay-
o in positing a connection between computers and minds. Among its other virtues, the
computational framework has rendered theorising about inner processes respectable, it has
provided a unied and naturalistic arena in which to conduct debates about psychological
models, and it provides the tantalising possibility of accurately simulating and reproducing
psychological processes.
ere is almost universal agreement that the mind is in some sense like a computer. But
consensus quickly ends once we ask how. Even aer more than thirty years of model
building, and a wealth of empirical work, surprisingly little consensus exists on the correct
answer to this question. What ismore, disagreement tends to lie at a relatively fundamental
level.ere is little agreement about the content of the notion of computation, what it
means for a physical system, like the brain, to implement a computation, the broad-brush
computational architecture of the mind, or how computational models t with other
models of the mind, such as control theoretic models, statistical models, or dynamical
systems theory.
is volume targets these questions.e contributors analyse the role that computation
plays in cognitive science, and the implications, based on our current evidence, this has for
the architecture of human psychology.e intention is not only to secure rmer ground
for contemporary cognitive science, but also to envision cognitive science’s next steps.
Let us take up the questions above. First, what exactly do we mean by computation, and
how does the notion of computation dier from related notions, such as information
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processing? Is there a single notion of computation, or should we be pluralists about
computation? Second, what does it mean to say that a physical system, like the human
brain, implements a computation? How is representational content involved in implement-
ation, if at all? What are the necessary conditions for implementation to obtain? Under
what conditions do two systems, e.g. an electronic PC and a human brain, implement
the same computation?ird, granted that one can agree about implementation, what
evidence can one bring to bear to determine the computational architecture of the human
mind? How do we assess the merits of a computational model, and which computational
architectures can we already, based on our current evidence, rule in or out? Fourth, how
do other approaches to explaining cognition, such as statistical theory, control theory, and
coupled-oscillator models, relate to computational models of the mind? Are they rivals to
explaining the mind in terms of computation, or themselves types of computation?
e papers in this volume fall into four groups, corresponding to the four groups of
questions above:
1. Distinguishing computation from related notions (e.g. information processing)
2. eories of implementation of computation
3. Computation at work in cognitive science
4. Projected successors to the notion of computation in cognitive science
1 Delimiting the notion of computation
e rst group of papers attempt to describe what we mean by computation in cognitive
science and contrast it with related notions. Is computation the same as information
processing? Does the concept of computation have the same content in all elds? What is
the dierence between genuine computations and computations that rely on an observer
to do the computational work?
In the rst paper, Ken Aizawa argues that the notion of computation has a more fragmen-
ted nature than is generally supposed. Orthodox histories of cognitive science tell of a
special role played by the notion of computation developed by Alan Turing and others in
mathematical logic.ese accounts emphasise the exportation of a ‘Turing-equivalent’
notion of computation into neuroscience, cognitive science, AI, and cybernetics, and
the subsequent computational revolutions caused in those elds. Aizawa argues that this
simple exportation analysis is mistaken. What is meant by ‘computation’ in dierent
elds depends largely on the local theoretical goals and interests of those elds. One
should not expect, and will not nd, a single fundamental notion of computation that
is shared in each and every domain of enquiry. Rather than telling a history of how the
Turing-equivalent notion was exported frommathematical logic, Aizawa counsels instead
to analyse a target use of ‘computation’ that has been tailored to a particular end (say,
neuroscience, cognitive science, etc.).e question a historian and philosopher should
ask is not how a general notion of computation is deployed across all elds, but what
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is the distinctive theoretical contribution that a particular use of the term ‘computation’
plays in each discipline. Aizawa considers various ways in which these specic notions of
computation can diverge from the Turing-equivalent notion. For example, they might
relax Turing’s niteness conditions, collapse computation into the notion of information
processing, or emphasise a distinction between computing and merely reproducing a
signal.
Gualtiero Piccinini and Andrea Scarantino argue that the notion of computation can be
distinguished from the notion of information processing. Piccinini and Scarantino distin-
guish between a number of dierent varieties of computation and information processing.
Among computations, they distinguish between digital and generic computation. Digital
computation involves rule-governed processing of (i) discrete symbols, which (ii) yield
input-output behaviour equivalent to that of some Turing machine. Generic computation
relaxes constraints (i) and (ii) and so allows for analog computers and hypercomputation.
Piccinini and Scarantino divide information processing into two kinds: processing of
Shannon information and processing of semantic information. Shannon information is a
thin use of ‘information’: it is no more than a measure of the probability of a certain event
occurring out of a dened domain of possible outcomes. Shannon information does not
require the event have meaning or semantic content (a meaningless message like ‘@X;D’
can carry just as much Shannon information as ‘e battle is won’). Semantic information
accords more with the commonsense meaning of the term. Messages must, in addition
to having a bare probability of occurrence, be individually meaningful. Piccinini and
Scarantino argue that while computations in cognitive science oen involve information
processing of either the Shannon or semantic kind, they need not necessarily do so.e
assumption that computation is always information processing has closed o potentially
productive lines of research.
Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot ask about the limits that should be placed on the
notation systems in a computation. All computations involve some notation system, but
not any notation system is permissible. Some notations, such as binary (‘0’ denotes 0, ‘1’
denotes 1, ‘10’ denotes 2, etc.) are kosher. But others allow Turing machines to compute
‘incomputable’ functions. Imagine a Turing machine that outputs the sequence: ‘1 2 3 . . . ’.
Consider the following notation: the nth digit of the output of a Turing machine means
‘e nth Turing machine halts’ just in case the nth Turing machine halts; otherwise, the
output means ‘e nth Turing machine does not halt’. Relative to this notation, the Turing
machine above solves the halting problem, a supposedly incomputable task. In order not
to trivialise the concept of a computable function, some limit must be placed that blocks
deviant notations. A natural thought is to allow only those notation systems that do not
themselves require solving an incomputable task to use.is has the virtue of ruling out
the halting-problem notation above, but the cost of being circular—it presupposes that a
deviant notation system is not being used in order to describe which tasks are and are
not computable. Copeland and Proudfoot argue that an alternative reply is available that
avoids this circularity worry. Turing’s original discussion of Turing machines oers two
natural and simple restrictions that block deviant notation systems.
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2 Implementing a computation
is group of papers concern how mathematical computation relates to the nuts and bolts
of physical systems. Computation is a notion with two faces: one side concerns computers
as abstract mathematical entities, the other concerns computers as physical machines.
What relates these two types of entity is the implementation relation. But how does imple-
mentation work? What are the necessary and sucient conditions for a physical system to
implement a computation? How does implementation relate to representational content?
e papers in this section put forward theories of implementation. e disagreement
between contributors tends to lie in the particular ways that representational content
should or should not enter into computational identity.
Frances Egan targets what she calls the ‘standard view’.e standard view says that the
representations involved in cognitive computations have essential distal representational
content. For example, the computational states involved in David Marr’s ‘edge-detection’
computation in the human visual system involve representations of distal features of the
subject’s environment: edges, light intensities, etc. Egan claims that it is wrong to think that
this distal content is relevant to the computation that the system performs. Computations
are individuated by themathematical function they compute, not by the distal content they
possess.e correct description of Marr’s edge-detection computation is that it computes
the mathematical function ∇2G ∗ I. It is irrelevant to the computation that its inputs
represent light intensities, and its outputs represent changes in light intensities. Devices in
dierent environments, or in dierent parts of the organism, can, and oen do, perform
the same computation (e.g. a fast Fourier transform), even if they manipulate dierent
distal content (e.g. one mechanism may process auditory signals, the other visual signals).
Egan suggests that distal content plays a non-computational role in psychology. On her
view, distal content ascriptions provide an ‘explanatory gloss’ on the purely mathematical
computation.e gloss is a bridge between the abstract mathematical computation and
the environmental task that the computationwas invoked to explain: e.g. How dowe detect
edges in the world? How do we perceive depth from two-dimensional input? A gloss links
the mathematical description to the relevant environmental content. Egan claims that
there is no science of how to develop these explanatory glosses. She argues that explanatory
glosses are not part of computational psychology proper, although they are part of the
informal motivation and explanatory deployment of that theory. One consequence of
her view is that cognitive science is freed from a commitment to a naturalistic account of
distal representation—ascription of distal content lies outside the realm of natural science.
Mark Sprevak argues for a more catholic view about the representational content involved
in computation. Sprevak claims that there are no serious constraints on the type of
representational content that can determine computational identity (representational
contentmay be distal, proximal, mathematical, narrow, broad, etc.). To this end, he focuses
initially on Egan’s ban on distal content. Sprevak argues that, with a combination of two
strategies, distal content can be accommodated just as well as Egan’s mathematical content
in determining computational identity. Indeed, a mixed position better explains the
pattern of our judgements about computational identity than a restriction tomathematical
content. Sprevak then turns to Fodor’s ‘formality condition’ that has been taken to justify
a restriction to narrow representational content in computations. Sprevak claims that
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Fodor’s argument rests on a mistaken privileging of computational states over processes.
Once computational processes take centre-stage, broad content can be seen to be just as
capable of determining computational identity as narrow content. In the nal section,
Sprevak sketches three arguments for why computation has to involve representational
content at all.e rst argument is based on paradigm cases of computation.e second
argument is based on the diverse physical and functional character of physical systems
that perform the same computational task.e third argument is based on the need for
any adequate notion of computation to draw certain distinctions, such as the distinction
between AND andOR, which are only visible aer one appeals to representational content.
Oron Shagrir puts forward a dierent account of implementation based on the notion of
analog computing. Shagrir argues that the notion of analog computing does not involve
any restriction to continuous variables. Rather, analog computing signies that the states
of a computer undergo the same transformation as the states in the environment that
they are taken to represent. An analog computer simulates a target system in a specic
sense: the computer’s physical states stand in the same mathematical relations as the
target states that the computer’s states represent. For example, cells in the V1 area of the
brain analog compute just in case the mathematical relationship between the electrical
properties of V1 cells (e.g. their ring rates), is the same as the mathematical relationship
between what ring of those cells represents (e.g. light intensities). Shagrir considers three
objections to his account. First, the proposal is not well-formed since the represented
entities are typically dierent in kind from the representing entities, and so cannot stand in
the same mathematical relation. Second, the proposal cannot accommodate certain types
of computational processes (e.g. planning) because they do not involve transformation of
existing states.ird, the proposal is too liberal because it permits any system to simulate
any other. Shagrir’s replies draw heavily on the representational nature of computation,
and like Sprevak, Shagrir argues that the content involved may be of almost any kind
(mathematical, distal, existing, non-existing, etc.).
3 Computation at work in cognitive science
Computational psychology faces a steep underdetermination challenge. Oen the only
way we test models in computational psychology is by employing behavioural evidence,
and such behavioural evidence confounds many psychological aspects of the human
subject. Teasing out how the behavioural evidence bears on specic proposals about
internal computations requires a great deal of care. e contributors in this section
consider how empirical evidence in cognitive science supports or undermines competing
computational models.
Richard Samuels defends a classical computational account of human reasoning and belief
revision. Cognitive science to date has made disappointingly slow progress in modelling
central thought processes like inductive inference and belief revision in a way that scales
beyond a highly restricted domain of beliefs. Rapid progress, in contrast, has been made
on computational models of peripheral cognitive processes, such as visual perception and
motor control.is pattern of explanatory failure has been explained by Fodor as arising
from a fundamental limitation of computational architectures. Samuels analyses a cluster
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of reasons why classical architectures have been perceived to be inadequate to central
reasoning: (i) the frame problem; (ii) the perceived holistic nature of rational inference
(viz. any belief may be relevant to the epistemic evaluation of any other belief); (iii) the
perceived global nature of rational inference (viz. evaluating certain properties of beliefs,
like simplicity and conservativeness, requires examining all one’s other beliefs). Samuels
argues that none of these features in fact decisively tell against a classical computational
account of reasoning. Rival non-computational, or non-classical computational, accounts
fare equally badly, if not worse, at accommodating these properties of reasoning. Samuels
puts forward an alternative explanation of the observed pattern of success and failure
in cognitive science: that pattern stems from the epistemic inaccessibility of central
processes in contrast to the relative accessibility of peripheral systems like perception and
motor control to testing. One should expect belief management to be a hard problem
on any architectural hypothesis—our lack of progress in explaining it does not specially
disconrm a classical computational architecture.
Daniel Weiskopf examines two rival computational hypotheses about linguistic under-
standing.e rst hypothesis, the embodied hypothesis, claims that linguistic understand-
ing reuses sensory and motor representation. According to this view, linguistic compre-
hension consists in experiential simulation (recreation) of the described situation using
existing sensorimotor representations and capacities.e second hypothesis, the tradi-
tional hypothesis, claims that the representations in linguistic understanding are unique,
amodal and distinct from sensory and motor codes. According to the second hypothesis,
linguistic understanding is a distinct computational module, separate from sensory and
motor systems, whose job it is to create an amodal semantic representation of the truth
conditions of the linguistic input.e two hypotheses oer rival computational architec-
tures for linguistic understanding. Weiskopf argues that the empirical evidence cited in
favour of the embodied hypothesis fails to support it, and that the traditional hypothesis
better accounts for the data. Empirical data for the embodied hypothesis consists largely in
compatibility eects: the observation that sensory and motor processing prime, or inhibit,
linguistic understanding (and vice versa). Weiskopf argues that compatibility eects can
be readily explained on the traditional hypothesis by saying linguistic comprehension is
causally related to sensorimotor processing, without assuming, as the embodied hypo-
thesis does, that the latter constitutes the former. Weiskopf accuses advocates of embodied
cognition of a vehicle/content fallacy when reasoning about how we bring information
about our sensorimotor capacities to bear. A cognitive systemmay use representations that
have a sensorimotor content in its linguistic processing, but that says nothing about the
nature of the format of those representations: the representations may be those employed
by the sensorimotor system, or they may be unique amodal representations that happen
to have the same sensorimotor content.
RaymondGibbs andMarcus Perlman reply toWeiskopf by raising three points in favour of
the embodied view. First, Weiskopf takes too thin a view of experiential simulation. Once
simulation is understood to involve, not just visual and motor representations, but also
emotional responses, then the embodied hypothesis can deal with certain counterexamples
that Weiskopf raises. Second, evidence from cognitive neuroscience demonstrates ac-
tivation of motor cortex and pre-motor cortex during linguistic comprehension. Gibbs
and Perlman ask why these brain areas would be automatically activated unless motor
6
simulation was part of linguistic understanding.ird, Gibbs and Perlman claim that the
traditional view is committed to an implausible two-stage model of language processing:
rst, literal truth-conditional meaning is computed, then the speaker’s meaning—which
may be gurative or metaphorical—is computed by combining truth-conditional meaning
with knowledge of the wider context and pragmatics. Gibbs and Perlman argue that if lin-
guistic understanding occurs in this way, then we would be slower to understand gurative
meanings than literal ones. But we oen comprehend gurative meaning faster than literal
meaning. Gibbs and Perlman claim that grasping gurative meaning requires sensorimo-
tor representations, and computing literal content cannot be separated from this process.
erefore, no part of language comprehension escapes sensorimotor involvement.
Weiskopf has a quick rejoinder. First, he claims that even on a richer notion of simulation,
counterexamples still arise to the embodied hypothesis’s treatment of compatibility eects.
Second, the neural imaging evidence about the activation of motor representations during
language comprehension is equivocal.ird, the traditional hypothesis is not committed
to a two-stage literal/gurative model of language processing.e traditional hypothesis
is only committed to the existence of a capacity to understand sentences abstracted from
their possible contexts of use.is capacity underlies semantics: theorising about prop-
erties like entailment, compatibility, contradiction, synonymy, and so on. Furthermore,
Weiskopf argues that even if sensorimotor representations do constrain gurative under-
standing in the way that Gibbs and Perlman suggest, that is compatible with sensorimotor
representations having a merely causal rather than a constitutive role in comprehension.
4 Successors to the notion of computation in cognitive science
Computational models cast a long shadow over cognitive science but they are not the
only theories on the market. Other approaches—dynamical systems theory, statistical
models, control theory, coupled-oscillator models—also enjoy predictive and explanatory
success. Are these models genuine alternatives to a computational approach, or are they
dierent types of computation? What advantages do these models have over traditional
computational models? Why do some psychological processes appear more apt to be
described by certain models than others? Is there a single theoretical framework that can
unite all approaches to cognition?e contributors in this section explore the properties
of alternatives to traditional computational models in cognitive science.
Chris Eliasmith examines four approaches to cognitive and brain function: traditional
computational models, dynamical systems theory, statistical models, and control theory.
He argues that control theory provides the best framework for understanding mind and
brain function. Eliasmith argues that other approaches are ultimately heuristics along
the way to the unied framework oered by control theory. Control theory provides a
quantitative approach for explaining brain function that stretches all the way frommodels
of single neurons, to neural populations, to high-level cognitive processes like language
comprehension and inference. Eliasmith compares the merits of the dierent approaches
along a single metric for the best quantitative description of cognition. According to this
metric, a description should: (1) provide a simple mapping from experimental data to
descriptive states; (2) decompose the system into its component mechanisms; (3) posit
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mechanisms that support interventions; (4) explain the eects of noise and variability
on the system. Eliasmith argues that control theory fares better than rival approaches on
these requirements, and thereby promises to best describe brain function. Control theory
may also be glossed as positing computations in a wider sense: systematic manipulation
of representations.
William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen highlight coupled-oscillator models.ey ana-
lyse recent research on circadian rhythms and consider how models developed in that
context could inform, and ultimately provide a new paradigm for, research in cognitive
science. Typically, explanations in cognitive science focus on nding the component parts
and operations of a cognitive mechanism. Bechtel and Abrahamsen argue that it is less
common to nd emphasis placed on the dynamics of how those parts and operations
relate, and how distinct cognitive mechanisms couple to produce complex eects. Bechtel
and Abrahamsen call this latter kind of explanation dynamic mechanistic explanation. In
circadian rhythm research, typically the component parts and the operations are known
by laboratory work on the composition of the relevant cells.e challenge is to show how
those parts and operations are dynamically orchestrated to produce the observed phenom-
ena. In cognitive science, the component parts and operations of the mechanisms, as well
as their dynamics, are largely unknown.is places computational modelers in a more
precarious epistemic position, and oen dramatically underdetermines their proposals,
leaving competition between rival proposals unwinnable (cf. classical vs. connectionist
debates over mechanisms for past tense formation).e solution, according to Bechtel
and Abrahamsen, is to demand more detailed specications of the mechanisms that make
predictions about the neurophysiology responsible for a given cognitive process. at
would allow empirical evidence from neuroscience to be brought to bear to validate the
models. Once we have a better grip on the parts and operations that realise a cognitive
mechanism, then the road is open for more sophisticated models that use the dynamics of
those parts and operations to explain how cognition is produced by, for example, coupling
relations.
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